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A DELIBERATE DIFFERENCE?: THE RIGHTS OF
INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE NEW
MEXICO STATE CONSTITUTION
Carson Thornton González*

Historically, to bring claims against government officials for
unconstitutional prison conditions, individuals incarcerated in
New Mexico had one vehicle for redress: Section 1983 claims
based on the protections of the Federal Constitution. If an
individual seeks relief via Section 1983 for prison conditions that
are in violation of the Eighth Amendments protections against
cruel and unusual punishment, courts apply a “deliberate
indifference” standard to determine the liability of prison officials.
This defendant-friendly standard requires that incarcerated
plaintiffs suffer an objective harm and—crucially—that the
relevant officials have a culpable state-of-mind of deliberate
indifference. In 2021, the New Mexico Legislature passed the New
Mexico Civil Rights Act (“NMCRA”) to provide a vehicle for
constitutional redress under the state constitution, essentially, a
state-level Section 1983 counterpart. As a result, practitioners in
New Mexico now have a unique opportunity to help define the state
constitutional rights afforded to incarcerated individuals and how
such rights deviate from federal constitutional law. This Comment
argues that New Mexico courts can—and should—reject the
federal “deliberate indifference” standard used to assess
unconstitutional prison conditions violations. Instead, when
interpreting the state’s Eighth Amendment analogue, New Mexico
courts should adopt a standard that better protects the rights of
incarcerated individuals.
INTRODUCTION
Like all forms of social hardship, the COVID-19 pandemic has had different
effects across the many intersections of society. To name just a few, the impacts of
the virus vary widely across different geographies, races, classes, and professions. In
the era of self-quarantine and social distancing, there are few settings less amenable
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to these directives than the contemporary prison. Indeed, as one might expect,
individuals who are incarcerated have been disproportionately affected by COVID19, as they have found themselves unable to socially distance or access adequate
medical care.1 In 2020, the rate of infections in prisons was more than four times that
of the public and the mortality rate of incarcerated individuals was double that of the
general population.2 A number of factors contributed to this disparity, including
“over-crowded [facilities] with rapid population turnover, often in old and poorly
ventilated structures . . . and a health care system that is siloed from community
public health.”3 While some states made efforts to decrease prison populations by
commuting sentences via executive orders and permitting early release by court order
and state legislation,4 these initiatives often fell short and thousands of individuals
incarcerated across the country consequently died of COVID-19.5 Additionally, the
virus-induced devastation in prisons disproportionately affected people of color due
to the well-documented racial and ethnic disparities in the correctional setting.6
Although the pandemic has—in some grim sense—shed new light on the
many shortcomings of the American penal system, the larger issues that gave rise to
such indignities are longstanding and deeply rooted. Shortcomings include (but are
not limited to) the overuse of solitary confinement,7 the utilization of private, forprofit prisons,8 and the prevalence of overcrowding in American correctional
facilities.9 Furthermore, the United States, with only 5% of the global population,
incarcerates a remarkable 25% of the global prison population—more individuals
than any other nation.10 In short, while the pandemic has (perhaps) offered a new
1. See, e.g., Kevin T. Schnepel, COVID-19 in U.S. State and Federal Prisons, COUNCIL ON CRIM.
JUST. 5 (Dec. 6, 2020), https://counciloncj.org/impact-report-covid-19-testing-in-state-prisons-2/.
2. Id. at 3.
3. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., DECARCERATING CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
DURING COVID-19: ADVANCING HEALTH, EQUITY, AND SAFETY 2 (2020) [hereinafter DECARCERATING
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES].
4. The most significant criminal justice policy changes from the COVID-19 pandemic, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.html (last updated Apr. 1, 2022).
5. Emily Widra, State prisons and local jails appear indifferent to COVID outbreaks, refuse to
depopulate
dangerous
facilities,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Feb.
10,
2022),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2022/02/10/february2022_population/.
6. See DECARCERATING CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, supra note 3, at 1.
7. Under the “Nelson Mandela Rules” put forth by the United Nations, “prolonged solitary
confinement” is defined as “a time period in excess of 15 consecutive days.” G.A. Res. 70/175, Nelson
Mandela Rules, Rule 43 (Dec. 17, 2015). In contrast, the United States often keeps people in solitary
confinement for months and even decades. See Alison Shames, Jessa Wilcox & Ram Subramanian,
Solitary Confinement: Common Misconceptions and Emerging Safe Alternatives, VERA INST. OF JUST.
15–16 (May 2015), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/solitary-confinement-misconceptionssafe-alternatives-report_1.pdf.
8. See generally Kara Gotsch & Vinay Basti, Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in
Private
Prisons,
THE
SENT’G
PROJECT
(Aug.
2,
2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/capitalizing-on-mass-incarceration-u-s-growth-inprivate-prisons/ (considering criticisms of for-profit, private prisons).
9. See generally Overcrowding and Overuse of Imprisonment in the United States, ACLU (May
2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/OverIncarceration/ACLU.pdf
(reporting on the causes of and issues with overcrowding in United States prisons).
10. Id. at 1.
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perspective on the manifold forms of misery that plague our correctional institutions,
the underlying injustices run far deeper.
In the face of these injustices, prison reform activism manifests itself in
various ways. In the legal context, however, one tool looms large: constitutional
litigation. For example, in the prison setting, lack of access to adequate medical care
may constitute a violation of the United States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment
protection against “cruel and unusual punishments.”11 However, though the Federal
Constitution can provide protections to incarcerated individuals in theory, those
seeking constitutional redress face many practical obstacles. Perhaps the greatest
impediment is the legal standard necessary to show a violation of the Eighth
Amendment: the so-called “deliberate indifference” standard.12 According to this
judicially created standard, to prove claims of unconstitutional prison conditions,
incarcerated plaintiffs are required to show both that the conditions they are living in
constitute an objective harm and that the culpable prison official possesses a state of
mind that shows deliberate indifference to that harm.13 This test is an extremely
difficult hurdle for plaintiffs who are incarcerated.14 Until recently, in New Mexico,
those who sought to bring constitutional claims against prison officials were
restricted to arguments based on this federal standard. These claims were almost
invariably litigated in federal court, with plaintiffs seeking relief under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, the federal statute that creates a cause of action against persons who
abridge rights created by the Constitution and laws of the United States.15 For New
Mexico’s entire history, incarcerated individuals could not seek alternative redress
in state court based on constitutional grounds.
However, New Mexico—like all states—has its own constitution, and in
theory, incarcerated individuals could seek relief under the state’s own unique civil
rights protections. Nevertheless, until recently, bringing claims under the New
Mexico Constitution was only possible in very limited circumstances.16 This
difficulty was due to the lack of any state law counterpart to Section 1983. The state
bill of rights, like its federal analogue, lacks any internal enforcement mechanism.
That is, it lacks an internal cause of action to enforce its protections, and until this
year, no Section 1983-esque state statute existed to fill the void. As a result, the civil
protections of the state bill of rights remained largely unlitigated.

11. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that deliberate
indifference by prison personnel to an incarcerated individual’s serious illness or injury is cruel and
unusual punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment).
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
14. See, e.g., Lori A. Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill
Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 487 (2004) (noting the near impossibility of satisfying the deliberate
indifference standard); Chad Flanders, COVID-19, Courts, and the “Realities of Prison Administration”
Part II: The Realities of Litigation, 14 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 495 (2021) (same); Brad
Taylor, Professional Judgment or Deliberate Indifference? Suicide Under the Eighth Amendment, 2020
U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 60 (2020) (same).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
16. See generally Linda M. Vanzi, Andrew G. Schultz & Melanie B. Stambaugh, State Constitutional
Litigation in New Mexico: All Shield and No Sword, 48 N.M. L. REV. 302, 306 (2018) (discussing the
history of constitutional civil rights litigation in New Mexico).
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Evidently aware of this dilemma, in 2021, the state legislature passed the
New Mexico Civil Rights Act (“NMCRA”).17 The NMCRA provides a cause of
action against government actors for civil rights violations under the state
constitution’s bill of rights. With the passage of this Act, the New Mexico legal
community has an opportunity to create and define state constitutional jurisprudence
that aligns more closely with New Mexico’s unique constitutional tradition and
values, such as protecting the rights of discrete classes of politically powerless
people.18 This legislation allows for, among other things, the formulation of a state
constitutional standard for prison conditions violations that better protects the rights
of individuals who are incarcerated. In this spirit, this Comment explores the reasons
to stray from federal precedent under the state constitution and encourages
practitioners to be creative in their approach to prison conditions litigation under the
NMCRA.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of prison conditions
litigation in the United States and examines Supreme Court cases that established the
“deliberate indifference” test. Part I also discusses the procedural realities of bringing
claims for unconstitutional prison conditions under Section 1983. Following this
discussion, Part II considers three reasons that compel state courts to stray from
federal precedent under New Mexico’s current mode of state constitutional law
interpretation when presented with the novel possibilities provided by the NMCRA.
Finally, Part III of this Comment offers potential alternatives to the “deliberate
indifference” standard that would better protect the rights of incarcerated individuals
under the New Mexico Constitution and align more closely with New Mexican
values and protections.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Federal Prison Conditions Case Law

Although this Comment ultimately focuses on the unique civil rights
afforded under the New Mexico Constitution, due to the methodology of state
constitutional interpretation (as well as the structure of federalism and the
Supremacy Clause19), discussion of relevant federal precedent serves as a necessary
foundation. When analyzing claims of prison conditions violations under the state
constitution, it is important to examine the federal precedent already in place, as
federal constitutional analysis can guide state courts in their own constitutional

17. 2021 N.M. Laws ch. 119, § 1 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4A-1 to -13 (2021).
18. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Brandwest Dairy, 2016-NMSC-029, ¶ 27, 378 P.3d 13 (establishing a
“constitutional duty to protect discrete groups of New Mexicans from arbitrary discrimination by political
majorities and powerful special interests” in the context of social and economic legislation) (internal
citations omitted); State v. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, 126 N.M. 738, 975 P.2d 351 (showing a willingness
to expand Eighth Amendment rights under the New Mexico Constitution).
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
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rulings.20 This is especially true where states have limited local precedent on state
constitutional issues, as is the case in New Mexico. Consideration of existing federal
constitutional standards not only provides a legal “floor” of basic rights protected by
the federal government,21 it also provides the potential reasoning for which state
constitutional law might depart from federal analysis.22
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens
against government infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”23 Although there
is debate as to the original meaning of this phrase,24 modern Supreme Court
jurisprudence has acknowledged that the interpretation of this Amendment is
dynamic, “not static.”25 According to this jurisprudence, the Eighth Amendment is
historically contingent and “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”26 While it is seemingly
plausible that these “evolving standards” are grounded in the “moral sense” of
individual judges and attitudes around the world about contemporary standards of
decency,27 the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated how courts should evaluate
these standards.28 Nonetheless, the “evolving standards of decency” of the Eight
Amendment continue to provide the basic analytical framework for federal
constitutional claims of prison conditions violations.
Historically speaking, until the second half of the twentieth century, both
federal and state courts took a “hands-off” approach to allegations of unlawful prison
conditions, generally deferring to the judgment of prison officials to determine the
adequacy of their institutions.29 For most of American legal history, the Eighth

20. See generally Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on
Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1025, 1027 (1985).
21. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550 (1986).
22. As will be discussed in Part I.C below, in New Mexico, courts have held that state constitutional
interpretation can depart from its federal analogue if the federal precedent is “flawed.”
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). The Eighth Amendment was applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment in Robinson v. California. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
24. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, Justice Scalia’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Failure of
Sake-of-Argument Originalism, 42 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 121 (2019) (Originalist Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia was of the belief that “the Eighth Amendment, properly understood, is defined by
the ‘common-law background’ and does not invite an inquiry into evolving standards of decency.”). For
example, when considering the constitutionality of the death penalty, Justice Scalia asked how the Court
could “hold unconstitutional that which the Constitution explicitly contemplates.” Glossip v. Gross, 576
U.S. 863, 894 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). He reasoned that “[h]istorically, the Eighth Amendment was
understood to bar only those punishments that added ‘terror, pain, or disgrace’ to an otherwise permissible
capital sentence.” Id.
25. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958).
26. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
27. See Lerner, supra note 24, at 105.
28. See generally SpearIt, Evolving Standards of Domination: Abandoning a Flawed Legal Standard
and Approaching a New Era in Penal Reform, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 495 (2015).
29. James J. Park, Redefining Eighth Amendment Punishments: A New Standard for Determining the
Liability of Prison Officials for Failing to Protect Inmates from Serious Harm, 20 QLR 407, 415–16
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Amendment was understood to only apply to sentencing; beyond that, incarcerated
individuals essentially had “no enforceable rights.”30 It was not until the 1960s that
state and federal courts began hearing cases involving prison conditions.31 In part,
courts were “motivated by the state of terror and violence that characterized certain
prisons” at the time.32 It was not until the 1970s, however, that the Supreme Court
began the work of developing a test to assess when prison conditions rise to the level
of a constitutional violation.33
Three Supreme Court cases from this era developed the current federal
standard for Eighth Amendment constitutional violations in prisons.34 The test—
known as the “deliberate indifference” standard—was first introduced in the 1976
decision Estelle v. Gamble.35 In Estelle, the Court considered an Eighth Amendment
claim brought by J.W. Gamble, an individual incarcerated in Texas.36 Gamble
claimed that he had received delayed and inadequate medical care from the
Department of Corrections after his back was injured while undertaking a prison
labor assignment.37 Asserting that the grossly inadequate medical care he received
constituted “cruel and unusual punishment,” Gamble brought a claim against the
director of the Department of Corrections, the warden of the prison, and the medical
director under Section 1983.38 In its first explicit pronouncement of the parameters
of the Eighth Amendment as they relate to prison conditions, the Court held that
“deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of
action under [Section] 1983” for violating the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.39 Nevertheless, the Court found that the defendants’ actions in
Gamble’s case did not rise to this level.40 Although the meaning of “deliberate
indifference” remained somewhat elusive in the opinion, the Court did provide some
preliminary clues.
(2001); see also Mikel-Meredith Weidman, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the Problem of
Supermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1509 (2004) (discussing judicial deference to prison officials for
claims of unconstitutional prison conditions prior to prison reform movements of the 1960s and 70s).
30. Park, supra note 29, at 416.
31. Id.
32. Id. For example, Arkansas’ entire prison system was found to be unconstitutional while other
prisons were essentially run by incarcerated individuals. Id. at 416 n.34.
33. In 1980, unconstitutional prison conditions were addressed in New Mexico via a consent decree
enforced by the Department of Justice. In a complaint filed against the Governor of the State of New
Mexico (then Jerry Apodaca), individuals incarcerated at the State Penitentiary of New Mexico reported
“overcrowding and other conditions” that “[fell] beneath standards of human decency, inflict[ing]
needless suffering on prisoners and create an environment with threatens prisoners’ mental and physical
well-being.” First Amended Complaint at 196a, Duran v. Apodaca, No. Civ 77-721P (D.N.M. July 6,
1978). In the settlement agreement, the Department of Corrections was implored to address specific issues
like acceptable living conditions and adequate medical care in New Mexico correctional facilities.
Settlement Agreement, Duran v. Apodaca, Civ. No. 77-721-C (D.N.M. July 14, 1980).
34. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294.
35. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97.
36. Id. at 98.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 107.
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Namely, the Court referenced various lower court cases that would meet the
“deliberate indifference” standard articulated by the Court.41 One such case involved
a prison doctor throwing away a patient’s ear that had been torn off in an attack and
stitching up the stump instead of exercising “professional judgment” in his
treatment.42 In another example, a prison nurse injected an incarcerated man with
penicillin, despite knowing he was allergic.43 When the individual suffered an
allergic reaction, a doctor in the prison concluded that the individual did not require
any further treatment.44 These examples, the Court suggested, would rise to a level
of “deliberate indifference” that would implicate the protections of the Eighth
Amendment.45 However, the Court in Estelle cautioned that failing to provide
adequate medical treatment did not “become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner.”46 Instead, the actions of the prison official had to
“constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” or be “repugnant to the
conscience of mankind.”47 In Gamble’s case, because the failure to treat his back was
not a “wanton infliction of pain,” the Estelle Court held that he did not have a
cognizable constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment.48
While the notion of a “deliberate indifference” standard was initially
articulated for cases of medical care in Estelle v. Gamble, it was not until nearly two
decades later that the standard was applied more broadly to prison conditions. In
Wilson v. Seiter, the Court heard a claim brought by Pearly Wilson, an individual
incarcerated in Ohio.49 Wilson complained of various inadequate conditions at the
prison, including “improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms,
unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and
physically ill inmates.”50 Individuals incarcerated in the prison suffered “heat-related
rashes” and respiratory issues from lack of ventilation in the summer51 and were
forced to “put blankets over their head” to stay warm in the winter.52 With Justice
Scalia writing for the majority, the Court held that to show a violation of the Eighth
Amendment for prison conditions violations, there must be a sufficiently culpable
state of mind: deliberate indifference.53 The Court reasoned that “[i]f the pain
inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing
judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer.”54 Justice
Scalia used textualism to support his opinion, arguing that “[a]n intent requirement

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 104 n.10.
Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974).
See Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 105–06.
Id. at 107–08.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991).
Id.
Brief of Petitioner at 3, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (No. 89-7376).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (No. 89-7376).
See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303.
Id. at 300.
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is either implicit in the word ‘punishment’ or is not.”55 Finding that “punishment”
necessarily requires a subjective component, the Court applied the “deliberate
indifference” standard from Estelle to constitutional claims for prison conditions
violations and remanded Wilson’s case to the lower court to be considered under this
standard.56
However, even after Wilson, the “deliberate indifference” standard still
lacked a formal definition. Three years later, in 1994, the Supreme Court finally
attempted to offer a more concrete definition of the standard in Farmer v. Brennan.57
In Farmer, the Court considered a claim from Dee Farmer, a transgender woman
housed in a male-designated detention facility.58 After being placed in general
population and suffering a brutal attack within two weeks, Farmer brought an Eighth
Amendment claim under Section 1983 against the prison officials who had placed
her in general population knowing the danger it posed to her as a transgender
woman.59 In its analysis, the Court outlined two prongs that must be satisfied to show
deliberate indifference: (1) the harm must be “sufficiently serious . . . [to] pos[e] a
substantial risk” to the individual, and (2) the prison official must have a “sufficiently
culpable state of mind.”60 The Farmer Court clarified that deliberate indifference is
a higher standard than negligence, more akin to criminal recklessness.61 Essentially,
deliberate indifference is “the equivalent of recklessly disregarding [the] risk.”62
Therefore, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.”63 Ultimately, Farmer’s case was remanded for the lower court to apply
the newly defined test.64 Since its decision in Farmer nearly 30 years ago, the
Supreme Court has not reconsidered the appropriateness of the deliberate
indifference standard.
This brief historical survey provides a basic foundation of federal law as it
relates to claims of unconstitutional prison conditions. A more detailed critical
analysis of the deliberate indifference standard and its impracticability is undertaken
below in Part II to demonstrate why it should not apply in New Mexico. However,
to provide further foundation for discussion of the NMCRA, this Comment now
turns its focus to the unique procedural characteristics of Section 1983—the statute
55. Id. at 301.
56. Id. at 303–05.
57. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
58. Id. at 829.
59. Id. at 829–30.
60. Id. at 834.
61. Id. at 835–36. Criminal recklessness involves “consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and
unjustifiable risk. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose
of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.” MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. L. INST. 2020).
62. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
63. Id. at 837.
64. Id. at 851. On remand, the district court found that the defendants “had no reason to believe that
plaintiff would be subjected to a substantial risk of harm” and granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Farmer v. Brennan, 81 F.3d 1444, 1448 (7th Cir. 1996). On appeal to the Seventh Circuit,
Farmer’s case was remanded on procedural grounds. Id. at 1453.
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that provides a cause of action to litigants seeking damages on the basis of violations
of the Federal Constitution.
B.

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act

Despite the protections provided by the federal and state constitutions in the
United States, the rights afforded by these documents are generally not selfenforcing. As such, legislation must be enacted to provide a legal cause of action to
enforce constitutional rights. As it relates to the federal system, the primary way to
bring constitutional claims against government officials is via Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act.65 Section 1983 allows claims to be brought against government
officials whose actions caused a deprivation of the individual’s rights protected
under the Constitution or laws of the United States.66 Because the NMCRA functions
in a similar manner to Section 1983, for the purposes of this Comment and to
compare the two causes of action, it is important to note several key features of
Section 1983.
Section 1983 was enacted in 1871 in the wake of the Civil War under the
Ku Klux Klan Act.67 The text of the statute states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.68
These words fundamentally altered the federal government’s relationship to
the states, allowing federal courts to intervene between State actors and their citizens
“as guardians of the people’s federal rights.”69 Despite this apparently radical
reorganization of American federalism, the statute went largely unused for nearly a
century, in large part due to an understanding that the statute’s “under color of law”
language “reached only misconduct either officially authorized or so widely tolerated
as to amount to ‘custom or usage.’”70
In the landmark case of Monroe v. Pape, the traditional understanding that
Section 1983 claims only applied to officially authorized conduct was rejected by

65. 42 U.S.C § 1983.
66. Id. After the adoption of the post-Civil War amendments, violence against Black Americans
pervaded the South. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 530, 530 (8th ed. 2021). The Senate
conducted investigations into the violence, “especially focusing on the role of the Ku Klux Klan.” Id. In
response, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871—the Ku Klux Klan Act—what is now known
as Section 1983. Id. The purpose of the Act was to “give a broad remedy for violations of federally
protected civil rights.” Id.
67. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 529.
68. 42 U.S.C § 1983 (emphasis added).
69. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
70. PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFERIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 917 (4th ed. 1998).
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the Supreme Court.71 In Monroe, the Court considered a Fourth Amendment claim
brought under Section 1983 against thirteen Chicago police officers who broke into
a family home without a warrant and forced the home’s occupants to stand naked in
the living room while the officers ransacked their belongings.72 When presented with
the question of whether these individual government officials could be held liable
under Section 1983, the Court held—for the first time—that actions taken in an
individual’s official capacity are “under color of law” for the purposes of Section
1983, regardless of whether the actions had been authorized by a government actor.73
Consequently, officials could be held liable even if not acting pursuant to their
position, but simply with the power conferred on them by their title.74 In Monroe, the
Court clarified that these causes of action were to be brought against individual
officials rather than government entities75—a detail that is important to emphasize
for our discussion of the NMCRA below.76
In subsequent cases, the Court further extended the group of possible
defendants that could be subject to Section 1983 suits. In another landmark case,
Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, the Supreme Court
considered a constitutional claim brought by pregnant city employees who were
being compelled—as a matter of official policy—to take unpaid leaves of absence
before it was medically necessary.77 In Monell, the Court held that cities, counties,
and other local government entities could be held liable for constitutional violations
under Section 1983.78 In essence, these entities were to be considered “persons” for
the purposes of Section 1983’s language. The Court, however, limited this particular
kind of “municipal liability” substantially to instances in which “execution of a
government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.”79 Therefore, under the Monell
doctrine, municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of their
individual employees.80 Instead, there must be a policy or custom put in place by the
municipality or local government that deprives individuals of their constitutional
rights.
Further, Monell claims contain a unique kind of pseudo-scienter
requirement akin to the deliberate indifference standard. To hold a municipality
liable under this theory, plaintiffs must show that “through its deliberate conduct,
the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.”81 Essentially, the
71. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 184–87.
75. Id. at 187–92.
76. See infra Part II.B.
77. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 660–61 (1978).
78. Id. at 694.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 691. Instead, there are five distinct ways to establish Section 1983 liability under the Monell
doctrine: (1) legislation made by municipal legislative bodies; (2) “actions by municipal agencies or
boards that exercise authority delegated by the municipal legislative body”; (3) actions by individuals
with final decision-making authority; (4) “government policy of inadequate training or supervision”; and
(5) the existence of a custom. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 557.
81. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (emphasis in
original).
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plaintiff “must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of
culpability.”82 Therefore, under the Monell doctrine, municipalities act as persons
and can also possess states of mind. As such—and importantly for the ensuing
discussion—the entity’s subjective culpability becomes an integral part of the
analysis. Because Monell claims can be brought under any Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, this state-of-mind analysis factors into Monell claims brought
under the Eighth Amendment.83
However, due to the limitations of the Eleventh Amendment, which
prohibits suits against states for money damages, 84 this same explicit state-of-mind
requirement has never been applied to state agencies—only municipalities and other
local government agencies. One of the core tenets of American federalism is the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and the protections that states are afforded from suit
by private citizens.85 As a result, the Supreme Court has held firm in its
understanding that state governments are not “people” for the purposes of Section
1983, using the protections of the Eleventh Amendment to support this conclusion.86
Importantly, no exceptions (like those provided to municipalities by the Monell
doctrine) have been created by the Court for state governmental entities.
From the perspective of litigants seeking to bring constitutional claims on
the part of individuals who are incarcerated, the inability to sue state governments
under Section 1983 is one of the statute’s major limitations. That is, while
individuals, municipalities, and local governments can be named in Section 1983
lawsuits, states—and state agencies—maintain their sovereign immunity. This is true
even if the state government entity itself is culpable and should be held liable for
constitutional violations by being named as a defendant.
A brief hypothetical is instructive to highlight this disparity. In New
Mexico, for example, an individual incarcerated at a county-run jail (like the
Metropolitan Detention Center in Bernalillo County) would be able to name any
culpable official, as well as Bernalillo County in their prison conditions lawsuit
brought under Section 1983. However, an analogous individual incarcerated at a
state-run prison (like the Penitentiary of New Mexico) would only be able to name
the individual prison officials and not the Corrections Department—despite the fact
that the harm suffered might have resulted from a departmental action or inaction.
Especially in the case of facility-wide failures, the inability to name the New Mexico
Corrections Department in a lawsuit profoundly limits the ability of litigants to hold
82. Id.
83. It is difficult for plaintiffs to establish unconstitutional policies or customs that violate the Eighth
Amendment, but it is not impossible. See, e.g. Haywood v. Wexford Health Sources, No. 16-CV-3566,
2017 WL 3168996 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2017) (Plaintiff successfully alleged a Monell claim by showing
repeated indifference to the health of incarcerated individuals through policy and custom).
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
85. The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects both the federal and state governments and their
actors from suit by private citizens. The rationale behind the doctrine is to “limit the general costs of
subjecting officials to the risks of trial—namely, distraction of officials from their governmental duties,
inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service.” 77 AM. JUR. 2D
United States § 60 (2022).
86. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
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these institutions accountable for their unconstitutional shortcomings. And here lies
the reason that the New Mexico Civil Rights Act is a useful and desirable piece of
legislation: the NMCRA provides individuals in state-run facilities the option to hold
the public body accountable.
C.

New Mexico Civil Rights Act (NMCRA) and State Constitutional Law
Interpretation
1.

New Mexico Civil Rights Act History and Purpose

As noted, until 2021 the only possibility for New Mexicans seeking redress
against state government officials who violated their Eighth Amendment rights was
under Section 1983. For example, incarcerated individuals in state-run facilities
suffering from inhumane prison conditions throughout the COVID-19 pandemic
could only bring their Eighth Amendment claims under this federal statute, and only
against individual officers. However, this has changed with the introduction of the
New Mexico Civil Rights Act.
Because of the limitations of Section 1983, many states have passed civil
rights acts for circumstances in which the federal law—constitutional or otherwise—
does not provide adequate relief.87 Many of these civil rights acts mirror the
protections and procedures of Section 1983 by allowing for constitutional claims to
be brought against government officials in their individual capacities.88 These Acts
have been motivated by a number of factors, including the option to expand liability
of government actors under the state constitution, as well as creating a vehicle for
compensatory damages. State-level civil rights acts are made possible by the
principle that state constitutions may provide greater protections than those afforded
by the Federal Constitution,89 as nothing in the latter document prevents states from
expanding liability for government actors or from waiving their own sovereign
immunity.90
In New Mexico, prior to the enactment of the NMCRA, claims under the
state constitution were limited to injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and certain
criminal procedure defenses.91 None of these remedies, however, provided adequate
redress for incarcerated individuals who suffered serious harm. While the New
Mexico Supreme Court had significantly expanded protections for criminal

87. See Steven H. Steinglass, The Importance of State Law, in SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS § 5:4 (2021).

88. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-101 (holding “every person” liable under color of law for
deprivation of rights and explicitly not waiving sovereign immunity); CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (claims
brought against “a person or persons”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131 (claims brought against “a
peace officer” for deprivation of rights under the Colorado Bill of Rights); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §
11I (claims brought against “a person or persons”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-148 (claims brought against
“[a]ny person or company” and “company” is defined as “any corporation, partnership, limited liability
company, joint-stock company, joint venture, or association”); N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:6-2 (claims brought
against “a person, whether or not acting under color of law”); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4682 (claims
brought against “any person”).
89. See Steinglass, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. Vanzi, Schultz & Stambaugh, supra note 16, at 306.
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defendants under the state constitution,92 it “[had] never interpreted the New Mexico
Constitution as an equal source of individual civil rights.”93 The call from
practitioners for a mechanism to enforce state constitutional rights was answered in
the form of the NMCRA. The legislation allows for plaintiffs to bring civil claims
against the government to recover for compensatory damages as well as attorney’s
fees.
Some brief legislative history illuminates the NMCRA’s purpose and
relationship to Section 1983. During the 2020 Special Session, in the wake of the
murder of George Floyd and the public outcry for an end to the defense of qualified
immunity, the New Mexico Legislature created the Civil Rights Commission (“the
Commission”) to develop legislation for holding public officials who engage in
misconduct accountable under the state constitution.94 By its own account, the
Commission was motivated by the fact that the New Mexico Legislature “[had] not
yet passed a law like Section 1983 to enforce the fundamental rights” guaranteed to
New Mexicans by the state constitution.95 In its report released in November of 2020,
the Commission advocated for a state analogue of Section 1983. The NMCRA was
formally introduced to lawmakers during the 2021 Legislative Session.
In its original draft, the NMCRA bill provided a cause of action “against a
public body or person acting on behalf of or under the authority of a public body for
a violation of the individual’s rights, privileges or immunities arising pursuant to the
Constitution of New Mexico,” and the bill provided no damages cap.96 After
navigating various committees in both chambers of the state legislature, the final
version of the bill had altered language to only bring claims under the state bill of
rights97 with a damages cap of two million dollars.98 Additionally—and crucially for
the analysis of this Comment—the bill’s language was changed to specify that
“[c]laims brought pursuant to the New Mexico Civil Rights Act shall be brought
exclusively against a public body.”99 Public bodies are to be “held liable for conduct
of individuals acting on behalf of, under color of or within the course and scope of
the authority of the public body.”100 For the purpose of the statute, “public bodies”
are defined as “a state or local government, an advisory board, a commission, an

92. See e.g., State v. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶ 17, 144 N.M. 151, 184 P.3d 1045 (holding that
absent exigent circumstances or some other exception to the warrant requirement, an officer cannot search
an automobile without a warrant); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035, ¶ 23, 142 N.M. 89, 163 P.3d
476 (holding that habeas petitioners must be allowed to assert claims of actual innocence under the due
process clause); State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 19, 140 N.M. 345, 142 P.3d 933 (recognizing a
right to privacy under Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution).
93. Vanzi, Schultz & Stambaugh, supra note 16, at 305 (emphasis added).
94. N.M. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N, NEW MEXICO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT, at 1 (2020).
95. Id.
96. H.B. 4, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2021).
97. See N.M. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–24.
98. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4A-3 to -6 (2021).
99. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4A-3(C) (2021) (emphasis added).
100. Id.
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agency or an entity created by the constitution of New Mexico or any branch of
government that receives public funding.”101
The NMCRA provides a novel opportunity for New Mexico courts to
interpret this language chosen by the legislature. No other state-level civil rights act
has held state government entities liable in a manner akin to the NMCRA.102 As a
result, New Mexico can be an example of the power that this type of legislation can
wield. However, on a fundamental level, although the NMCRA provides litigants
with a cause of action to enforce the protections of the state bill of rights, the actual
content of these protections can only be articulated according to the rules of
constitutional interpretation employed by the New Mexico judiciary. As such, before
exploring the possible rights afforded to incarcerated individuals under the state
constitution, this Comment will first discuss the method by which state court judges
can analyze the provisions of the state constitution.
2.

Modes of State Constitutional Law Interpretation

As previously noted, a basic tenet of federalism and state constitutional law
is the concept that, while the federal constitution provides a “floor” for individual
rights, state constitutions can go “above and beyond” these baseline protections.103
Essentially, states cannot provide fewer rights than the Federal Constitution, but they
can provide more—thus serving as “laboratories” that experiment with providing
greater rights to their citizens.104 As such, while New Mexico courts must provide
the basic rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, they are allowed to expand
those rights under the state constitution. The introduction of the NMCRA as a vehicle
to bring claims under the New Mexico Bill of Rights provides courts with the
opportunity to experiment in the constitutional laboratory. How those rights will
differ from their federal counterparts, however, depends crucially on the mode of
interpretation used by the courts.
To date, New Mexico courts have recognized three methods of state
constitutional interpretation.105 The first, the “lock-step” approach, looks exclusively
to federal precedent to guide the formation of state law.106 In short, if there exists a
federal constitutional analogue to a given state constitutional provision, the state
constitutional analysis mirrors the precedent set forth by federal courts as closely as
possible.107 The second mode is the “primacy” approach, or the “self-reliant

101. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4A-2 (2021). Importantly, the NMCRA also bars the use of the defense
of qualified immunity and provides for attorney’s fees in these causes of action. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 414A-4 (2021).
102. Other state civil rights acts hold individual officials responsible, rather than public bodies. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (claims brought against “a person or persons”).
103. Brennan, supra note 21, at 550.
104. Id. at 549–50.
105. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. When a state constitutional right
has not been interpreted differently than the federal analog, a party “must assert in the trial court that the
state constitutional provision at issue should be interpreted more expansively than the federal
counterpart and provide reasons for interpreting the state provision differently from the federal provision.”
Id. at ¶ 23, 932 P.2d at 8.
106. Id. ¶ 16, 932 P.2d at 6.
107. Id.
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approach.”108 Primacy “focuses on the state constitution as an independent source of
rights and relies on it as the fundamental law.”109 Under this approach, “federal law
and analysis are not presumptively correct” and the court is encouraged to “look first
to the state provision and to state history, doctrine, and structure.”110 The final mode
of interpretation—somewhere in the middle of the previous two—is the “interstitial”
approach.111 Under the interstitial approach, the state court looks first to federal
precedent and if the right is protected under the federal constitution, the court will
follow that analysis.112 The state court will only diverge from federal precedent if
there is “a flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal
government, or distinctive state characteristics.”113 In 1997, New Mexico courts
adopted the interstitial method of constitutional interpretation.114
Since then, New Mexico courts have used the interstitial approach to depart
from federal precedent in various circumstances. Under the first reason to depart—
“flawed federal analysis”—the Supreme Court of New Mexico has provided greater
rights for criminal defendants under Article II, Section 10, of the New Mexico
Constitution (the state analogue of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution).115 For example, in Campos v. State, the court rejected federal
precedent that found warrantless arrests to be constitutionally permissible.116 The
court “decline[d] to adopt the blanket federal rule that all warrantless arrests of felons
based on probable cause are constitutionally permissible in public places.”117 Instead,
each case involving a warrantless arrest of a felon would be “reviewed in light of its
own facts and circumstances.”118 Under the interstitial approach, the court held that
there would not be an assumption of constitutional permissibility, thereby departing
from established federal precedent.119 The court reasoned that New Mexico had
shown a “willingness to accord defendants more protection under [its] search and
seizure provision than the federal courts accord under the Fourth Amendment.”120
The second potential reason to depart from federal precedent— “distinctive
state characteristics”—has been described in various ways by New Mexico courts.121
108. Utter, supra note 20, at 1027.
109. Id. at 1028.
110. Id.
111. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 932 P.2d at 7.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. ¶ 21, 932 P.2d at 7.
115. See Campos v. State, 1994-NMSC-012, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117; State v. Gutierrez, 1993NMSC-062, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052.
116. Campos, 1994-NMSC-012, ¶ 10, 870 P.2d at 120.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See State v. Cordova, 1989-NMSC-083, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30; see also State v. Granville,
2006-NMCA-098, 140 N.M. 345, 142 P.3d 933 (holding that New Mexico’s expansion of the Fourth
Amendment and its distinct interest in privacy protections prohibited warrantless searches of garbage);
State v. Sutton, 1991-NMCA-073, ¶ 24, 112 N.M. 449, 816 P.2d 518 (noting that land plot sizes in rural
New Mexico are often large and that “interpretation and application of the state constitution must take
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For example, in State v. Cordova, the Supreme Court of New Mexico again
considered a constitutional claim under Article II, Section 10 of the state
constitution.122 The federal courts had adopted a “totality of the circumstances” test
in lieu of a two-prong test for obtaining search warrants, finding that the two-prong
test was “[applied] in too rigid and technical a fashion by some courts.”123 The
Supreme Court of New Mexico rejected this approach, noting the distinctive
characteristic of successfully applying the two-prong test in state courts, despite its
rigidity.124 Therefore, the New Mexico court rejected the federal precedent and
continued to apply the two-prong test in place of the “totality of circumstances”
standard.125
New Mexico courts have used the third and final reason to depart from
federal precedent under the interstitial approach—“structural differences between
federal and state government”—sparingly.126 When adopting the interstitial approach
in State v. Gomez, the New Mexico Supreme Court cited scholarship that defines this
ground for divergence as “general institutional differences between the state
government and its federal counterpart, suggesting that constraints on the federal
doctrine might be less relevant at the state level.”127 This is how the Supreme Court
of New Mexico applied “structural differences” in Montoya v. Ulibarri.128 There, the
court held that plaintiffs could seek habeas relief under the state constitution on a
freestanding claim of innocence, contrary to established federal precedent.129 The
Montoya court reasoned that the governing federal precedent “was informed by
concerns of federalism and an unwillingness to overturn convictions of petitioners
who have been afforded fair trials in state courts.”130 In contrast, those principles of
federalism did not constrain the state courts.131 As such, the court found that this
“structural difference” between the state and federal government was sufficient
reason to depart from federal precedent.132

into account the possibility that such differences in custom and terrain gave rise to particular expectations
of privacy when the state constitution was adopted.”).
122. Cordova, 1989-NMSC-083, 784 P.2d 30. Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution
states: “The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without
describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing
of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.” N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10.
123. Cordova, 1989-NMSC-083, ¶ 17, 784 P.2d at 36.
124. Id. ¶ 15, 784 P.2d at 35 (The court reasoned that the two-prong federal test “[had] not proved to
be a problem in [its] state courts’ application of the standard.”) It is worth noting that the court in Cordova
never mentions the phrase “distinctive state characteristics” in its analysis. Id. However, in Gomez, the
Supreme Court cited Cordova when discussing “distinctive state characteristics” as a rationale for
departing from federal precedent. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 20, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1.
125. Cordova, 1989-NMSC-083, ¶ 17, 784 P.2d at 36.
126. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 932 P.2d at 7.
127. Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1324, 1359 (1982).
128. Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 20–21, 142 N.M. 89, 163 P.3d 476.
129. Id. ¶ 1, 163 P.3d at 478.
130. Id. ¶ 20, 163 P.3d at 483.
131. Id. ¶ 21, 163 P.3d at 483.
132. Id.
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Since the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in Gomez, the interstitial
approach has been used to interpret various provisions of the state constitution.133 In
some cases—mostly for criminal defendants—rights under the New Mexico
Constitution have been expanded. The enactment of the NMCRA provides many
more opportunities for courts to interpret the New Mexico Bill of Rights, giving
additional force to state constitutional rights.
II.
ADOPTING A DIFFERENT STANDARD FOR PRISON
CONDITIONS ANALYSIS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION
The NMCRA went into effect on July 1, 2021. As practitioners begin to use
the Act to bring constitutional claims in the coming years, it is important to keep in
mind the NMCRA’s unique potential to help craft a distinctive state constitutional
civil rights jurisprudence. As it relates to prison conditions litigation, this Comment
argues that practitioners should carefully consider the ways in which incarcerated
individuals might be better protected under the state constitution than under the
Federal Eighth Amendment.
Again, under New Mexico’s current mode of constitutional interpretation—
the interstitial approach—when considering a novel constitutional question, a
reviewing state court will consider first whether there is a federal analogue to the
relevant state constitutional provision. In the case of the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution practically mirrors
the language of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.134 The text of
Section 13 is longer, as it provides for greater rights with regard to bail, but the “cruel
and unusual punishment” language is almost indistinguishable from the Federal
Constitution (except that the word “punishment” in Section 13 is singular instead of
plural).135 Article II, Section 13 reads, in relevant part, “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted.”136

133. See, e.g., id. (interpreting Article II, Section 18, which ensures due process, and Article II, Section
13, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, 140 N.M. 345, 142
P.3d 933 (interpreting Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution); State v. Nunez, 2000NMSC-013, 129 N.M. 63, 2 P.3d 264 (interpreting Article II, Section 15, protections against double
jeopardy).
134. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13.
135. Id.
136. Id. (emphasis added). Section 13 reads, in full: “All persons shall, before conviction be bailable
by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great and
in situations in which bail is specifically prohibited by this section. Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. Bail may be denied by a court
of record pending trial for a defendant charged with a felony if the prosecuting authority requests a hearing
and proves by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions will reasonably protect the safety
of any other person or the community. An appeal from an order denying bail shall be given preference
over all other matters. A person who is not detainable on grounds of dangerousness nor a flight risk in the
absence of bond and is otherwise eligible for bail shall not be detained solely because of financial inability
to post a money or property bond. A defendant who is neither a danger nor a flight risk and who has a
financial inability to post a money or property bond may file a motion with the court requesting relief
from the requirement to post bond. The court shall rule on the motion in an expedited manner.” Id.

Summer 2022

A DELIBERATE DIFFERENCE?

565

Indeed, in 1999 the New Mexico Court of Appeals noted in dicta that the
Eighth Amendment and Section 13 “are nearly identical in their wording.”137
However, despite the similarity in wording of the two provisions, in a later case, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico found that Section 13 has “been interpreted as
providing greater protection than [its] federal counterpart[]”—at least as it pertains
to the principle of proportional punishment.138 Although the Eighth Amendment
concept of proportionality is analytically distinct from the Eighth Amendment
protections surrounding conditions of confinement, this acknowledgement by the
Supreme Court shows a willingness to expand Eighth Amendment rights under
Section 13, despite the nearly identical “cruel and unusual punishment” language. In
short, the Supreme Court’s affirmation of “greater protection”—as well as various
other factors discussed in detail below—call for reconsideration of the federal
standard when interpreting Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution.
With the interstitial mode of constitutional interpretation in mind, the
following Sections will analyze three compelling reasons to depart from federal
precedent and adopt a new standard under the state constitution: (1) the current
federal analysis for Eighth Amendment claims is flawed; (2) the New Mexico
legislature purposefully distinguished language in the NMCRA from its federal
equivalent: Section 1983; and (3) the State of New Mexico has distinctive
characteristics that suggest a changing attitude towards individuals who are
incarcerated.
A.

Flawed Federal Analysis

As was noted above,139 the federal standard for prison conditions
litigation—deliberate indifference—contains both an objective and a subjective
prong. Not only must plaintiffs prove that a substantial risk of serious harm is present
in the prison setting, but they must also show that the culpable prison official acted
with the requisite state of mind. The following Section will explore two distinct
reasons that explain why the subjective element of the deliberate indifference test
falls short of adequately protecting incarcerated individuals under the Eighth
Amendment—thus rendering it “flawed.” First, the analysis considers legal
scholarship that points out the flaws in a standard that incentivizes the ignorance of
prison officials and makes it nearly impossible for incarcerated individuals to
succeed on their claims. Second, this Section reflects on arguments against the
deliberate indifference standard from members of the United States Supreme Court.

137. State v. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, ¶ 8, 126 N.M. 738, 975 P.2d at 353.
138. Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035, ¶ 22, 163 P.3d at 484. Here, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
refers to the decision in State v. Rueda. Id. In Rueda, the Court of Appeals considered whether the
proportionality review of punishment should apply to noncapital cases in New Mexico. Rueda, 1999NMCA-033, ¶ 12, 975 P.2d at 354. The court in Rueda looked to a plurality opinion from the United
States Supreme Court in which “the prevailing majority was unable to agree concerning the
appropriateness of conducting proportionality review in noncapital cases.” Id. (discussing Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)). The Rueda court explicitly rejected the “assertion that a defendant may
not invoke a proportionality review.” Id. ¶ 13, 975 P.2d at 354. While the Court of Appeals did not
expressly reject federal precedent, it showed a willingness to expand Eighth Amendment rights under the
New Mexico constitution.
139. See supra Part I.A.
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First, the current federal standard inherently encourages indifference to the
needs of incarcerated individuals.140 The federal standard only holds prison officials
liable when they have actual knowledge of the harm and subsequently disregard that
knowledge. This actual knowledge component is problematic, as it “suggests that
prison officials’ obligations to prisoners are merely episodic, arising only when they
happen to notice possible threats to prisoners’ well-being.”141 Under this standard,
prison officials are not held liable when they “fail to notice risks that any reasonably
attentive prison official . . . would have noticed and addressed.”142 Therefore,
deliberate indifference “promotes failures of care at both the micro and macro
levels,” whether the constitutional violation results from an individual officer
inflicting harm or a prison-wide failure to protect.143 In short, the current federal
standard incentivizes not noticing risks, as prison officials cannot be held liable if
they do not possess actual knowledge of the harm.
The flaws inherent in the deliberate indifference standard are also evidenced
by the lack of concrete definition for the level of culpability that must be proven
when challenging unconstitutional prison conditions. As Professor Brittany Glidden
notes, the difficulty in defining the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference
standard makes the test “almost prohibitively ambiguous.”144 Even if an objective
risk is established by a plaintiff who is incarcerated, “many commentators have
questioned the ability of prisoners to present satisfactory evidence of mindset.”145
The closest the Supreme Court came to defining the level of culpability necessary to
show deliberate indifference was in Farmer v. Brennan. There, the Court defined the
subjective prong as “subjective recklessness” as it is used in the criminal law
context.146 If this is the case, the subjective prong is an undeniably high threshold of
culpability to meet, as there must be actual knowledge. Proving a poorly defined but
seemingly difficult culpable mindset is an inherent flaw in the deliberate indifference
test.
Apart from academic critique, Supreme Court justices have raised concerns
about the appropriateness of the deliberate indifference standard since the test was
first established. In his dissent in Estelle v. Gamble, Justice Stevens suggested that
the deliberate indifference test was a flawed standard for prison conditions
analysis.147 Stevens questioned the implementation of a state-of-mind requirement
and suggested that the “Court improperly attache[d] significance to the subjective

140. See generally, Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 945 (2009); Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and
Prisoner Interests in Determining What is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1858 (2012);
See also Park, supra note 29, at 450 (noting that “even if a defendant knows of the underlying facts of a
specific risk, he can avoid liability by arguing that he did not subjectively appreciate the magnitude of the
danger.”).
141. Dolovich, supra note 140, at 945.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 946.
144. Glidden, supra note 140, at 1858. See also Nicole B. Godfrey, Institutional Indifference, 98 OR.
L. REV. 151, 153 (2020) (defining the subjective prong as “hopelessly unclear”).
145. Glidden, supra note 140, at 1858.
146. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839–40 (1994).
147. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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motivation of the defendant.”148 Justice Stevens reasoned that an individual’s
subjective motivation may be useful in determining what remedy is appropriate, but
stated that “whether the constitutional standard has been violated should turn on the
character of the punishment rather than the motivation of the individual who inflicted
it.”149 In a footnote, Justice Stevens acknowledged that “[i]f a State elects to impose
imprisonment as a punishment for crime,” the government “has an obligation to
provide the persons in its custody with a health care system which meets minimal
standards of adequacy.”150 He recognized that “the State and its agents have an
affirmative duty to provide reasonable access to medical care[,] . . . [f]or denial of
medical care is surely not part of the punishment which civilized nations may impose
for crime.”151 Justice Stevens pointed out the flaws with the intent element of the
deliberate indifference test that would ultimately hold true in its application.152
Later, in Wilson v. Seiter, Justice White argued in his concurrence that the
subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test would likely “prove impossible
to apply in many cases” when challenging inhumane prison conditions.153 This is
because “[i]nhumane prison conditions often are the result of cumulative actions and
inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long
period of time.”154 Justice White noted that the majority in Wilson gave “no real
guidance” as to whose intent should be examined and argued that “intent simply is
not very meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a prison
system.”155 The Justice expressed concern that “serious deprivations of basic human
needs” in prisons would ultimately “go unredressed due to an unnecessary and
meaningless search for ‘deliberate indifference.’”156
Finally, in his concurrence in Farmer v. Brennan, Justice Blackmun would
agree with Justices Stevens and White “that inhumane prison conditions violate the
Eighth Amendment even if no prison official has an improper, subjective state of
mind.”157 Blackmun also noted that prison officials have an “affirmative duty under
the Constitution to provide for the safety of inmates” and that this duty is “not to be
taken lightly.”158
In short, the flaws inherent in the federal deliberate indifference analysis
have been noted since its establishment—both by academic commentary, as well as
by sitting Justices on the Court. In large part for the reasons articulated by these

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 117 n.13.
151. Id.
152. Justice Stevens would later affirm his belief that a subjective component is improper in his
Farmer concurrence. 511 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 310 (1991) (White, J., concurring).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 311.
157. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 851 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 852.
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sources, the federal analysis in this area is “flawed” and compels New Mexico courts
to reconsider its application under the state constitution.159
B.

Language of the NMCRA is Purposefully Distinct from Section 1983

Apart from the federal standard’s inherent flaws, the distinctive language
of the NMCRA compels reconsideration of the deliberate indifference standard
under the state constitution. As noted above,160 under the NMCRA, plaintiffs bring
claims of constitutional violations exclusively against “public bodies.” For the
purpose of the statute, “public bodies” are defined as “a state or local government,
an advisory board, a commission, an agency or an entity created by the constitution
of New Mexico or any branch of government that receives public funding.”161
Remarkably, across all fifty states, the NMCRA is the only state-level civil
rights act that exclusively holds the public body accountable and abrogates sovereign
immunity by including the state government under the definition of public body.
Every other state civil rights act mirrors the language of Section 1983 by holding
individual government officials responsible for constitutional wrongdoing.162 The
unique language of the NMCRA bringing claims “exclusively against public bodies”
is therefore a distinctive state characteristic in the most obvious sense: it is a feature
that is entirely distinctive to New Mexico state law. Under the interstitial mode of
interpretation, “distinctive state characteristics” require special consideration of the
federal standards to analyze claims of constitutional violations under the state
constitution.

159. The fraught history of prison litigation in the United States would be incomplete without mention
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”): 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2018). Passed one year after the
Farmer v. Brennan decision, the PLRA prevents any action from being brought under Section 1983 unless
all available administrative remedies are exhausted. Id. This hurdle prevents many cases from ever being
filed or reaching the courts. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 526–28 (“The number of prisoner
suits filed in federal court fell from 41,215 in fiscal year 1996 to 28,635 for fiscal year 1997 . . . [I]t is
clear that the Prison Litigation Reform Act is a substantial limit on the ability of prisoners to file [Section]
1983 suits in federal court.”).
160. See supra Part I.C.
161. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-2 (2021). The full text reads: “As used in the New Mexico Civil Rights
Act, ‘public body’ means a state or local government, an advisory board, a commission, an agency or an
entity created by the constitution of New Mexico or any branch of government that receives public
funding, including political subdivisions, special tax districts, school districts and institutions of higher
education, but not including an acequia or community ditch, a soil and water conservation district, a land
grant-merced, a mutual domestic water consumers association or other association organized pursuant to
the Sanitary Projects Act or a water users’ association.’” Id.
162. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-101 (West 1993) (holding “every person” liable under color
of law for deprivation of rights and explicitly not waiving sovereign immunity); CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1
(West 2021) (claims brought against “a person or persons”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131 (West
2021) (claims brought against “a peace officer” for deprivation of rights under the Colorado Bill of
Rights); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11I (West 1979) (claims brought against “a person or persons”);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-148 (West 1977) (claims brought against “[a]ny person or company” and
“company” is defined as “any corporation, partnership, limited liability company, joint-stock company,
joint venture, or association”); N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:6-2 (West 2004) (claims brought against “a person,
whether or not acting under color of law”); ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 4682 (West 2001) (claims brought against
“any person”).
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But this distinctiveness, of course, begs the question of its implication: i.e.,
what does this textual uniqueness signal about the use of the NMCRA? To begin
with, it is important to note that the NMCRA, on its face, asks practitioners to do
something that cannot be done under Section 1983: sue state agencies directly. As
such, the interpretation of the NMCRA cannot simply mirror the federal law that has
developed around Section 1983. To determine the procedural dynamics of this type
of lawsuit, New Mexico courts—without any guidance from federal law—will have
to determine how to analyze state constitutional claims against state governmental
bodies. This task will involve the crucial determination of the precise way in which
these bodies can be sued, and—perhaps most importantly—how these bodies can
have “subjective” intent to act in particular ways. Simply put: if the federal standard
for a certain constitutional claim involves subjective intent, how might that intent be
imputed to a non-human entity like a state agency?
Of course, the notion of non-human “personhood” is not a novel concept in
the law. Nevertheless, few non-human entities have been given legal personhood
under constitutional law and the exceptions for government entities are narrow. As
the United States Supreme Court has noted, this is in part because the attachment of
subjectivity to non-human entities—as opposed to government officials—brings
with it “considerable conceptual difficulty.”163 The idea that courts can readily
determine the subjective motivation of a group of prison officials in the same manner
as an individual “grossly misrepresents government-imposed punishment.”164
Invariably, such punishment involves “a complex set of practices that involve a wide
array of actors and institutions”—a matrix of policies and motivations profoundly
dissimilar to the internal dynamics of individual human decision-making.165 In the
Eighth Amendment context, “[r]arely can a single coherent intent be attributed to the
entire institutional apparatus that imposes punishment.”166 While individual officers’
states of mind may be relevant to the inquiry, they are not dispositive indications of
“whether the system is imposing punishment.”167
This conceptual difficulty becomes even more apparent when considering
an entity (e.g., a New Mexico state agency) that has enjoyed sovereign immunity
from civil rights claims for the entirety of its existence. States and their agencies
cannot be held liable for claims of constitutional violations under Section 1983.168
With these challenges in mind, how should New Mexico courts approach
constitutional claims against state-level non-human governmental entities that have
never before been subject to such claims?
One answer is to look to Supreme Court decisions that address the liability
of other kinds of non-human government entities. Monell v. Department of Social
Services, discussed above,169 is one such doctrine. The Monell doctrine applies
specifically to local governments and municipalities, giving those entities a form of
163. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841.
164. Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1353, 1399–400 (2008).
165. Id. at 1399.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376 (1990).
169. See supra Part I.B.
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“legal personhood” under Section 1983.170 However, the Court’s holding in Monell
was narrow—the liability of these public bodies would be limited to unconstitutional
policies or customs only.171
In theory, the Monell doctrine could be applied by courts to state agencies
under the NMCRA as it is applied to municipalities and local government bodies
under Section 1983. However, the requirement of proving that a policy or custom
violated an individual’s constitutional rights is a difficult standard to meet. In fact,
the Monell doctrine itself could be considered “flawed federal analysis.”172 In a postMonell dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer noted that “Monell’s basic effort to
distinguish between vicarious liability and liability derived from ‘policy or custom’
has produced a body of law that is neither readily understandable nor easy to
apply.”173 In an empirical study of policies governing police misconduct, surveyed
attorneys noted “that the current doctrine makes it difficult for a plaintiff to prove a
case against the city, resulting in fewer victorious claims for plaintiffs.”174 An
attorney commented that these cases are “always dismissed under Monell.”175
Due in large part to these shortcomings, when assessing the liability of state
agencies under the NMCRA, New Mexico courts should not turn to the Monell
doctrine. The limiting of liability to unconstitutional policies and longstanding
customs under the NMCRA would go against the legislative intent of the Act, which
plainly sought to expand the possibilities for holding government officials
accountable. Additionally, the NMCRA limits plaintiffs to suing the public body and
there is no option to sue individual government officials. Therefore, unless an
individual can show that a policy or custom is the moving force behind a
constitutional violation, there is no government liability. It is likely that simply
adopting the Monell doctrine or a Monell-like standard would essentially render the
NMCRA useless for claims of unconstitutional prison conditions.
However, if New Mexico courts reject a Monell-like standard for assessing
prison conditions claims, the question still remains as to how the courts should assess
claims of unconstitutional prison conditions under the state constitution. While
suggestions are offered below,176 for the purposes of this Section, it is important to
recognize that the doctrine already put forth by the United States Supreme Court will
not suffice. Not only is the Monell doctrine flawed for the reasons discussed above,
but the language of the NMCRA is distinct from Section 1983. Attempting to make
Monell “fit” under the NMCRA simply would not work. This unique aspect of the
NMCRA—this “distinctive state characteristic”—and its purposeful departure from
the language of Section 1983 suggests that New Mexico courts should reconsider
federal precedent under the state constitution.

170. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
171. Id. at 694.
172. See Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
627, 667 (1999) (describing Monell as a “doctrinal mess”).
173. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 433 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. Lisa D. Hawke, Municipal Liability and Respondeat Superior: An Empirical Study and Analysis,
38 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 831, 849 (2005).
175. Id.
176. Part III.
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Initiatives and Legislation Providing Incarcerated Individuals in New
Mexico With Greater Rights

Apart from the flawed federal analysis for prison conditions outlined above
and the unique procedural aspects of the NMCRA, a different sort of distinctive state
characteristic in New Mexico likewise suggests straying from federal precedent. For
one, as previously mentioned, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has shown a
willingness to expand rights under the state’s Eighth Amendment analogue.177 But,
more broadly, the state’s changing attitude towards incarcerated and recently
incarcerated individuals is a distinctive characteristic that should compel New
Mexico courts to devise a standard for evaluating constitutional violations of prison
conditions that is more responsive to the rights of this vulnerable population. To
quote the United States Supreme Court, the state’s “evolving standards of decency”
and changing attitude towards people who are incarcerated necessitates
reconsideration of the analysis used to evaluate the conditions in which they live.
The New Mexico legislature has responded to the needs of people who are
incarcerated by passing various laws in recent years protecting and expanding the
rights of those individuals. Additionally, recent state-funded initiatives are indicative
of New Mexico’s desire to protect the rights of incarcerated people. The following
Section considers legislation passed since 2019 that suggests a growing interest in
prison reform by the state legislature: (1) the Restricted Housing Act; (2) significant
amendments to the Criminal Offender Employment Act; and (3) the Criminal
Expungement Act. Finally, to conclude, this Section considers a state-funded
initiative, Project ECHO, that likewise suggests a changing attitude towards
incarcerated individuals by bodies that receive state funding.
New Mexico has shown interest in protecting and expanding rights of
individuals who are incarcerated or recently incarcerated in its most recent legislative
sessions. First, in 2019, the New Mexico Legislature introduced the “Restricted
Housing Act.”178 This Act protects certain individuals from the harms of solitary
confinement or “restricted housing.”179 Under the Act, restricted housing is explicitly
banned for individuals who are “younger than eighteen years of age” and those who
are “known to be pregnant.”180 Additionally, the legislation creates procedural
hurdles for prison officials when placing individuals with serious mental
disabilities181 in restricted housing, with the objective of preventing them from
experiencing predictable health issues in that environment.182 Finally, the Act
requires that every correctional facility in the state create a report every three months
documenting how many individuals were placed in restricted housing and the

177. See supra Part II.A.
178. H.B. 364, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019) (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-16-1 to -7
(2021)).
179. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-16-3 to -4 (2021).
180. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-16-3 (2021).
181. “Serious mental disabilities” are defined by the Act as “(1) a serious mental illness, including
schizophrenia, psychosis, major depression and bipolar disorder; or (2) having a significant functional
impairment along with a brain injury, organic brain syndrome or intellectual disability.” N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-16-2(D) (2021).
182. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-16-4 (2019).
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reasons for the placement.183 This information is to be made available to the public
in order to hold correctional facilities accountable for their use of this form of
punishment.184 This additional oversight and interest in limiting the use of restricted
housing is evidence of New Mexico’s evolving standards of decency.
Second, New Mexico’s “Criminal Offender Employment Act” was
amended in 2021 to reflect an evolving attitude towards rehabilitation and reentry of
incarcerated individuals.185 Originally enacted in 1974, the legislation was inspired
by the belief that the public is better protected when individuals who are released
from prison “are given the opportunity to secure employment or to engage in a lawful
trade, occupation or profession and that barriers to such employment should be
removed to make rehabilitation feasible.”186 In its original form, the legislation
prohibited “records of arrest not followed by a valid conviction” and “misdemeanor
convictions not involving moral turpitude” from being distributed with public
employment applications.187 In 2021, the Act was amended to include all
“convictions that have been sealed, dismissed, expunged, or pardoned,” as well as
“juvenile adjudications” and “convictions for a crime that is not job-related for the
position in question.”188 The Criminal Offender Employment Act was amended as
part of a nationwide, decade-long effort to introduce “ban-the-box” and “fair chance
hiring” legislation in the United States.189 The Act showed an effort on the part of
the New Mexico Legislature to provide opportunities for recently released
individuals to aid in the process of their reentry.
Additionally, New Mexico has shown its desire to protect incarcerated
individuals’ rights through the “Criminal Expungement Act” passed by the
legislature in 2019.190 This legislation allows certain individuals to have their
criminal records expunged.191 Importantly, two sections were added in the 2021
Special Session that further expand those rights. First, the legislature added a section
outlining the procedure for expunging marijuana convictions retroactively192 in light
of the legalization of recreational marijuana in New Mexico in 2021.193 The added
section states that all public records referencing a cannabis charge will automatically
be expunged two years after the date of the person’s arrest or conviction “[i]f a person
was charged with an offense involving cannabis that is no longer a crime on the

183. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-16-5 (2019).
184. Id.
185. 1974 N.M. Laws 218.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (2021).
189. These ordinances “prevent employers from asking about arrest or conviction information until
later in the hiring process.” See generally Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform?
Recent Developments at the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 367 (2016).
190. 2019 N.M. Laws ch. 203, § 1 (codified as N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-3A-4 to -9 (2021)).
191. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-3A-4 to -5 (2021).
192. 2021 N.M. Laws ch 3., § 5 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-3A-8 (2021)).
193. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2C-1 (2021).
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effective date of the Cannabis Regulation Act.”194 The second section applied the
statute to individuals who are incarcerated.195 The state was given one year to review
marijuana-related charges and determine whether the person’s sentence could be
dismissed and their record expunged.196 This retroactive application of expungement
for certain marijuana-related charges is further evidence of New Mexico’s
commitment to recognizing the rights of individuals affected by the criminal justice
system.
Finally, there has been a push in the legislature to move away from the use
of private prisons in New Mexico. Private prisons are problematic on their face, as
these profit-driven institutions “contain a built-in incentive for the contractor to
economize” by cutting the cost of labor and reducing the amount spent on the needs
of individuals who are incarcerated.197 Therefore, “[a]bsent effective checks, efforts
on the part of private prison administrators to cut operational costs could thus lead
to decisions that deprive inmates of basic human needs, a hallmark of inhumane
punishment.”198 The “Private Detention Facility Moratorium Act” was presented to
the New Mexico legislature during the 2021 Regular Session.199 The bill would have
made it “unlawful for any person, corporation, business, or nonprofit entity to operate
a private detention facility.”200 The legislation also would have prohibited public
funding of privately run facilities and removed the state’s authorization to enter into
contracts with independent contractors.201 Although the bill did not pass, the purpose
of the Act has been put in motion as the state attempts to move away from the private
prison industry. In 2019, nearly 50% of New Mexican prisons were privately run.202
In June of 2022, private prisons made up two of the twelve facilities.203
Apart from these pieces of legislation, New Mexico has invested in
initiatives that aim to benefit currently incarcerated individuals and those individuals
who have recently been released. For example, New Mexico has shown an interest
in improving medical care for incarcerated individuals through state-funded
initiatives like Project Extension for Community Health Outcomes (“Project
ECHO”).204 A subdivision of Project ECHO—the Hepatitis C Elimination Project—
was created in response to the epidemic of Hepatitis C (“HCV”) in New Mexico
194. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-3A-8 (2021). The Cannabis Regulation Act also shows the state’s interest
in decriminalizing drug use and the benefits of not choosing to incarcerate people for minor drug offenses.
This seems to consider the larger issue of decarceration and departing from incarceration as punishment
in general.
195. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-3A-9 (2021).
196. Id.
197. Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L. J. 437, 471–80 (2005).
198. Id. at 480.
199. H.B. 40, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2021).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Press Release, Eric Harrison, Public Information Officer, New Mexico Corr. Dep’t, NMCD to
Convert
Additional
Private
Prison
(July
16,
2021),
https://cd.nm.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/NMCD-to-convert-additional-private-prison-facility.pdf.
203. NMCD Prison Facilities, N.M. CORR. DEP’T., https://www.cd.nm.gov/divisions/adultprison/nmcd-prison-facilities/.
204. See Karla Thornton et al., The New Mexico Peer Education Project: Filling a Critical Gap in
HCV Prison Education, 29 J. OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR AND UNDERSERVED 1544, 1545–46 (2018).
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prisons.205 The project aims to “provide[] high‐quality, low‐cost health education
that addresses HCV risk behaviors and exposure to a large number of incarcerated
people.”206 This model uses technology to disseminate information about HCV by
facilitating a weekly teleconference between specialists and medical providers in
New Mexico prisons.207
Additionally, Project ECHO has two programs that directly engage with
incarcerated and recently released individuals around New Mexico.208 First, the New
Mexico Peer Education Project (“NMPEP”) empowers incarcerated individuals to
act as educators themselves in addressing HCV in the prisons.209 Second, Project
ECHO recently founded the Community Peer Education Program (“CPEP”), which
targets recidivism and works with individuals who have left the prison setting and
reentered their communities.210 CPEP is fully funded by the New Mexico
Corrections Department and allows individuals who have been through the probation
and parole system to guide others as they are released from New Mexico prisons.211
NMPEP and CPEP are examples of initiatives supported by and/or funded in-part by
the state government. This investment in better health and reentry outcomes for
incarcerated individuals is a distinctive characteristic of New Mexico’s changing
attitude towards protections against cruel and unusual punishment.
These distinctive state characteristics, in conjunction with the flawed
federal analysis currently in place and the unique language of the NMCRA, compel
reconsideration of the federal prison conditions standard under the interstitial
approach.
III.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
STANDARD

While the previous Section of this Comment discussed the rationales for a
New Mexico constitutional departure from federal Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
as it relates to prison conditions protections, this Section approaches the logical
follow-up question: what is a more appropriate standard? The standards put forth in
this Section could be implemented in New Mexico should it choose to depart from
federal precedent under the interstitial approach and adopt a new standard for prison
conditions under Section 13 of the state constitution. This Section considers two
workable possibilities that present a move towards greater protections: 1) an

205. See id. at 1544. (“Hepatitis C virus is prevalent in epidemic proportions in U.S prisons. Estimated
HCV prevalence ranges from 9.6% to 41.1% compared with 1% in the general population.”).
206. Id. at 1545.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1545–46.
209. Id. at 1546 (“Since 2009, Project ECHO has trained 482 (10.8% female) incarcerated people to
become NMPEP peer educators in seven prisons. As of October 2016, 482 peer educators have trained
3,797 general population prisoners in 10‐hour peer‐led workshops and 5,066 prisoners have participated
in the three‐hour educational session.”).
210. Matthew Reisen, Peer Education Initiative for Prisoners Goes Mainstream, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(Sept. 14, 2021, 12:02 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/2428894/peer-education-initiative-forprisoners-goes-mainstream.html.
211. Id.

Summer 2022

A DELIBERATE DIFFERENCE?

575

objective approach; and 2) a standard more akin to tort liability for prison conditions
violations.
The standards considered here are rooted in the idea that the state owes an
affirmative duty to protect individuals it chooses to incarcerate. This idea, however,
is not novel. In 1926, the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted that the public
should be “required to care for the prisoner, who cannot, by reason of the deprivation
of his liberty, care for himself.”212 This affirmative duty imposed on the state was
fleshed out more recently by Professor Sharon Dolovich, who calls this responsibility
the state’s “carceral burden.”213 This burden is the “price society pays” for using
incarceration as its main method of punishment.214 The idea is that this carceral
burden “allows society to remove certain individuals from the shared public space,
but only on the condition that the state assumes an ongoing affirmative obligation to
meet the basic human needs of the people exiled.”215 If the state does not wish to
incur this burden, it can choose to invest in other forms of seeking justice.
Additionally, because prison sentences have the potential to last for extended periods
of time, prison officials must be “proactive” in their approach to prison conditions—
”[t]hey must pay attention to existing conditions, notice possible dangers, investigate
them, and take appropriate steps to prevent unnecessary suffering.”216
A.

Objective Unreasonableness

Any test used to analyze prison conditions violations should correspond
with this affirmative duty incurred by the state. Judges and scholars alike have
considered an objective test, essentially eliminating the subjective prong of the
deliberate indifference test.217 As discussed above,218 in their respective dissent and
concurrence, Justices Stevens and Blackmun both advocated for an objective
approach to the issue of unconstitutional prison conditions. In effect, an objective
test would consider “whether plaintiffs were subjected to a substantial risk of serious
harm of which a reasonably attentive prison official would have known.”219
An objective standard of this sort might look like the analysis articulated in
Kingsley v. Hendrickson for pretrial detainees bringing claims of excessive force
under the Fourteenth Amendment.220 In Kingsley, the Supreme Court considered a
claim from an individual who was detained pretrial at a county jail in Wisconsin for
a drug charge.221 After refusing to remove a piece of paper from the light above his
bed, Kingsley was forcibly removed from his cell.222 Once removed, his head was

212. Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926).
213. Dolovich, supra note 140, at 892.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See e.g., id.; Park, supra note 29; Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration,
Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 425 (2018).
218. See supra Part II.A.
219. Dolovich, supra note 140, at 948.
220. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015).
221. Id. at 392.
222. Id.
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slammed against a concrete bunk and he was tased in the back.223 Kingsley brought
a Section 1983 claim against the prison officials for excessive use of force under the
Fourteenth Amendment.224 The Court held that, for claims of excessive force that
violate an individual’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
“relevant standard is objective not subjective” and “the defendant’s state of mind is
not a matter that plaintiff is required to prove.”225 Instead, “a pretrial detainee must
show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively
unreasonable.”226 However, the Court noted that this standard could not be applied
“mechanically” and instead would have to be fact determinative, considered on a
case-by-case basis.227 Further, in applying this objective standard, the court only
considers “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the
officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”228 As such, despite
its objective nature, this standard is still deferential to the decisions of prison
officials.
Because of its deferential quality, simply ridding the current “deliberate
indifference” standard of the subjective prong to create an objective standard would
present its own challenges. As noted in the Kingsley decision, the current “objective
unreasonableness” standard outlined by the Supreme Court is considered from the
perspective of “a reasonable officer on the scene.”229 The American legal system has
historically been extremely deferential to law enforcement officials, especially in the
context of corrections.230 This deferential attitude is evidenced by the Court’s refusal
to intervene in issues of prison conditions until the 1960s.231 Because of this history,
an objective approach might “incline judges and juries—who are already prone to
sympathize with uniformed peace officers—to find officers’ conduct reasonable and
not to impose liability.”232
Additionally, the history of societal indifference to incarcerated individuals
in the United States necessitates careful implementation of an “objective” standard.
Importantly, there is a “tendency to regard as less than human the people we
incarcerate” in this country’s penal system.233 This can be attributed to various
factors, including a lack of transparency about the reality of American prisons and
223. Id. at 392–93.
224. Id. at 393.
225. Id. at 395.
226. Id. at 396–97 (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 397.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 350 n.14 (1981) (noting that security in correctional
facilities is “a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators”); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143
F.3d 1299, 1313 (10th Cir. 1998) (“We hesitate to interfere with prison officials’ decisions concerning the
day-to-day administration of prisons, to which we must accord deference.”); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d
895, 917 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the court would not “micro-manage” a prison’s emergency plans).
See also Nicole B. Godfrey, Creating Cautionary Tales: Institutional, Judicial, and Societal Indifference
to the Lives of Incarcerated Individuals, 74 ARK. L. REV. 365, 421 (2021).
231. See supra Part I.A. See generally Mikel-Meredith Weidman, The Culture of Judicial Deference
and the Problem of Supermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1505 (2004).
232. Dolovich, supra note 140, at 955–56.
233. Id. at 960.

Summer 2022

A DELIBERATE DIFFERENCE?

577

“a culture of fear that permeates American imagination” and results in a belief that
incarcerated individuals “are bad guys, just getting what they deserve.”234 The lack
of transparency surrounding carceral systems in the United States shields the
tragedies of those systems from the public eye.235 This prevents society at large from
making critical assessments about the humanity of these institutions. Additionally,
the culture of fear surrounding incarcerated individuals is largely misleading,
employing fearmongering rhetoric to maintain the status quo.236 Many of the issues
presented in this Comment concerning the deliberate indifference standard are
“allowed to perpetuate because of an overarching societal indifference to the harms
suffered by people behind bars.”237
However, while an objective standard in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
may risk the adoption of this judicial and societal deference, it is important to note
the inherent value in an objective approach. Unlike a tort claim, which requires a
showing of actual harm, a deliberate indifference test without the subjective prong
would require only a showing of a “risk” of serious harm. At least analytically, a
standard of this sort would resolve some of the current obstacles presented by the
deliberate indifference standard by allowing courts to avoid determining whether
officials acted with deliberate malice, and instead focusing on whether the official
acted reasonably. As a result, this objective standard should be—at the very least—
considered by courts and litigants making arguments about a New Mexico
constitutional departure from the deliberate indifference standard for prison
conditions violations.
B.

Negligence Standards

Legal scholars have also presented tort liability standards for prison
officials to better protect the constitutional rights of incarcerated individuals as an
alternative to the deliberate indifference standard. This tort liability could look like
a landowner-invitee relationship238 or something closer to strict liability.239 Both
standards would impose an affirmative duty on prison officials to protect the
individuals they choose to incarcerate. In tort law, under landowner-invitee liability,
an owner of a premises “who directly or impliedly invites others to enter” their land
owes “a duty to use ordinary or reasonable care to have his or her premises in a
reasonably safe condition.”240 Additionally, “if the owner is aware of a dangerous
condition,” they have “a duty to warn the invitee of such condition.”241 In the prison
setting, incarcerated individuals are not “invitees” in the traditional sense. However,
if the court were to apply this framework and recognize that correctional departments
owe the same duty that landowners owe to invitees by choosing to incarcerate those
individuals, prison officials would “be liable for objectively serious harms suffered
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by a prisoner caused by the prison official’s failure to take reasonable precautions to
protect the prisoner from risks of serious harm that are discoverable with reasonable
care.”242 This analysis would impose an affirmative duty on prison officials not only
to use reasonable care to keep the prison safe, but to uncover harms that are
reasonably discoverable.
Finally, a strict liability standard might help better protect the rights of
incarcerated individuals. If the state were to adopt a strict liability standard,
“plaintiffs who suffered sufficiently serious harm at the hands of the state would
recover notwithstanding a finding of good intentions on the part of individual
officers.”243 As Professor Dolovich points out, the affirmative duty incurred by the
state “operates against the backdrop of a heightened official obligation to take care
as regards the health and safety of prisoners.”244 Therefore, “when state officials
subject prisoners to substantial risks of serious harm, they have manifested a gross
deviation from the standard of care that the state owes its prisoners.”245 Unless there
was a showing of good intention by the prison officials, the state would be held
responsible for harms suffered by individuals who are incarcerated. This standard, in
theory, would provide the greatest protections for the incarcerated population.
However, in some basic unavoidable sense, proposals that suggest any form
of affirmative duty ultimately require an objective standard to determine what is
unreasonable in the prison context. In order to show that there is an objectively
unreasonable condition, or that strict liability has been met, there must be some
uniform standard of decency. But how—and who—should be the arbiter of such a
standard?
One approach would be the creation of a state-level prison condition
oversight committee. Because of the stigma regarding incarcerated individuals and
the tendency to believe that those who have been convicted of a crime are deserving
of lesser living conditions, a diverse oversight committee would be best positioned
to approach this question in a democratic and collaborative manner. In theory, such
a body could consist of lawmakers, prisoners’ rights advocates, victim rights
advocates, victims themselves, individuals who are incarcerated and other
community members who can collaborate to create a standard set of conditions that
must be met in the correctional setting. This group could look beyond the United
States to other models of incarceration around the world,246 as well as the latest
scholarship on punishment and cognitive science. These inquiries would include
considering the role that correctional officers play in prison conditions violations and
assessing the power dynamics that influence determinations of “objectively
unreasonable” conduct on the part of such officials.247 While promoting humane
prison conditions in the United States likely goes beyond the creation of a uniform
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standard of decency, a statewide consensus on what is objectively unreasonable
would be an important first step in creating a less cruel system.
Ultimately, the New Mexico Civil Rights Act approach—holding “public
bodies” accountable—all but necessitates some version of an objective standard for
assessing violations of Section 13. By holding government entities responsible
instead of individuals, the language of the Act suggests a desire to correct systemwide
failure. An objective standard (in some form) meets this challenge and would “ensure
both appropriate judicial condemnation of cruel prison conditions and the creation
of pressure for institutional reform.”248 If incarcerated individuals repeatedly name a
certain state agency in civil rights lawsuits, greater change could occur as a result of
mounting pressure.
In short, the NMCRA allows the possibility that an institution and its
practices will be held responsible for the injustices perpetuated in our prisons—not
simply a “bad apple” individual officer. While the objective and tort liability
standards discussed above are valuable jumping off points, this Comment
encourages practitioners in New Mexico to be creative in their approach to
establishing prison conditions standards under the state constitution.
CONCLUSION
The basic purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate how and why New
Mexico constitutional jurisprudence should depart from the Eighth Amendment
standard of deliberate indifference as it relates to the constitutionality of prison
conditions. To make this argument, this Comment discussed the current nature of the
federal standard, compared and contrasted Section 1983 and the NMCRA, and gave
several reasons why interpretation of Section 13 can depart from federal law under
the interstitial approach. Finally, this Comment has gestured towards the possibility
of new approaches to prison conditions that could be adopted under Section 13 that
would better protect the constitutional rights of individuals incarcerated in New
Mexico. As noted above, the NMCRA offers the possibility of a unique set of state
constitutional protections that are defined and articulated by the state’s legal
community.
However, while the New Mexico Civil Rights Act and the possibility of
greater protections for incarcerated individuals under Section 13 is an important step
in the right direction, the issue of inhumane prison conditions goes beyond providing
greater rights for those already incarcerated. Ultimately, the current state of
American correctional facilities calls for an overhaul of the carceral system and a
reconsideration of the use of incarceration as punishment. In a society that purports
to be an emblem of democracy, the treatment of incarcerated individuals in the
United States is a stark example of the ways in which our practices fall short of the
lofty and noble ideals to which we aspire. Additionally, the carceral system fails on
its face as it disproportionately impacts people of color and low-income individuals,
a further downfall that calls for significant action far beyond the scope of prison
conditions litigation. Larger, institutionalized, historical issues in American society
are at play here.
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Ultimately, as long as the United States stigmatizes incarcerated individuals
and fails to address the root causes of crime, prison conditions will remain inhumane.
Broadly speaking, in addition to trying to make the carceral system currently in place
more humane, the United States should be working as a community to make living
on the outside more equitable. Time, energy, and resources should be funneled into
healing initiatives like reformative justice programs, and movements to decrease
wealth inequality and improve access to education and health care. Until the United
States reckons with its history and the purpose of its choice to incarcerate, change in
the carceral system will continue to be limited and incremental. Nevertheless,
incremental change can still matter in a very material sense. The state constitutional
approach suggested by this Comment may be a modest step in this direction, but it
cannot be the only one.

